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RELIGION AND RUSSIA’S INVASION OF UKRAINE
Religion and politics, church and state, are intimately connected in Eastern Europe, and so
it comes as no surprise that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has a significant religious dimension
to it. At the center of this religious aspect of the crisis is the struggle between the Russian Orthodox
Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate on one side and, on the other,
the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, which was formally declared to be autocephalous by the
Patriarchate of Constantinople in 2019. Although the latter was given the status of self-governing
only recently, both churches trace their roots back to the conversion of Grand Prince of Kyiv,
Volodymyr (or Vladimir for Russians), in 988. From that point on, the development of the two
churches is complicated and convoluted, with the Russian Orthodox church gaining autocephaly
in 1448. The Ukrainian church was forced to switch subordination from Constantinople to the
Moscow Patriarchate in 1686 and from that point until 2019, it was formally bound to Moscow,
although two other Orthodox Churches were established in Ukraine prior to 2019.
The implications of the decision by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I to establish a
Ukrainian autocephalous church in 2019 is analyzed in rich detail by Denys Shestopalets in an
article in this issue. He calls this a “crisis of greater magnitude than other similar incidents and
disputes,” analyzing its roots in the 1686 arrangement by which the Kyiv Metropolitanate was
given over to Moscow and comparing the different representations of the events of 1686 that
emerged in the years prior to the 2019 split. Russian political and religious leaders were infuriated
by the recognition of the independence of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine in 2019; the position
of Ukrainian Orthodoxy within the Moscow Patriarchate had served an important role in justifying
the argument that Ukraine was simply part of greater Russia. Since then, there have been struggles
between the two churches over everything from control of holy sites to the loyalties of small
parishes. Before the invasion, it was estimated that 700 parishes operated as part of the Ukrainian
church with the other 12,000 parishes still connected to the Moscow Patriarchate. This will change.
If Russia manages to subdue Ukraine, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine will likely be subdued, and
parishes may be forced to redirect their loyalties to Moscow. If Ukraine triumphs, the Orthodox
Church in Ukraine will likely grow at the expense of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow
Patriarchate. Whatever the result of the present conflict, though, it is already clear that religion is

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MARCH 2022) XLII, 2

x

tightly wound up in Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Mark Elliot’s article in this issue offers readers
an eye-opening account about the support of Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kyrill for the invasion,
calling it an “unholy alliance joining at the hip a predatory Putin and a sycophantic Russian
Orthodox Patriarch Kyrill.” He concludes, “At present Putin, with Kyrill in tow, is about the
destruction of a democratic, religiously tolerant state that is home to arguably the most robust
Christian population of any country in Europe.”
There are other religious dimensions to this crisis, too many to enumerate adequately in
this space. Religious groups are actively working from within and outside of Ukraine to help
citizens who are fleeing Ukraine, and faith organizations are leading vigils for peace and raising
funds to support Ukraine. The Jewish faith of Volodymyr Zelensky has become a part of his
patriotism, a piece of the story about his heroic defense of the Ukrainian state and people. There’s
also a very different religious aspect to this crisis: some evangelical leaders in America have come
out in support of Putin’s invasion, calling it part of God’s divine plan, even while Putin is
smothering religious freedom in his own country. They are taking their cues from the Patriarch
Kyrill, who justified the invasion publicly by saying it was about defending pure Christianity,
stopping the spread of gay parades and human salvation. In this narrative, the conflict is a cultural
war in defense of traditional values.
In the midst of any academic discussion on the religious aspect to this crisis, we cannot
lose sight of the personal element. The world is watching with bated breath, hoping against all
odds that the next news cycle will tell us that this is all over, that the Russian forces are returning
home. As we wait, the destruction wrought by Russian artillery only increases, destroying
buildings, roads, and communities. Even more heartbreakingly, as we wait, we are confronted
with images of Ukrainian dead, civilians—even young ones—lost to the brutal weapons of war
that are being now being used indiscriminately on Ukrainian soil.
Other articles in this issue do not directly address this situation, as they were written and
submitted prior to the invasion, and yet they will now be read with the knowledge of the crisis.
One of the articles in this issue of OPREE details the situation of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Ukraine,
starting with the assumption that the actions and attitudes towards this group can be seen as a
litmus test for religious freedom in a given state. The article defends the Ukrainian state’s treatment
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, giving evidence that, with few exceptions, they have been largely
unhindered in practicing their faith in Ukraine; virtually no complaints of violations have been
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registered with human rights organizations. This signals strong support for religious freedom,
particularly for non-traditional religions that are more vulnerable to religious freedom violations.
The authors note the sharp contrast between the situation of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Ukraine vs.
their situation in Russia, where they were banned at the federal level in 2017 after facing decades
of scrutiny and abuse. Hundreds of Jehovah’s Witnesses have been prosecuted as extremists since
that time, many facing extraordinarily high fines or even imprisonment. Since the invasion, we are
forced to consider a Ukraine without religious freedom, where all but the Orthodox churches
within the Moscow Patriarchate face discrimination.
A different article, coming from Forum 18 and reprinted in this issue of OPREE, details
the restrictions against non-Russian Orthodox religious groups in the rebel-held parts of Luhansk
(Donbas). The religious restrictions are so severe that, according to Forum 18, all Protestant and
non-Moscow Patriarchate Orthodox communities have failed to receive permission to exist, and
those that are operating are either doing it secretly or have faced punishments. This article, as well
as the one on the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Ukraine, came to OPREE in February, but before the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. They now bear witness not only to the dire situation of religious
freedom in Russia but offer a window into what we might expect to see if Ukraine were to be
subjugated by Ukraine.
We stand with Ukraine, not only as a matter of peace, but in support of a future for Ukraine
where religious freedom can flourish and where dialogue, respect, and peace among people of
various worldviews—this journal’s aim for its own articles—can be the future of Ukraine. Yes,
like so many others, We Stand with Ukraine.
Beth Admiraal, Co-editor of OPREE
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